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Staggs: Torts: Florida Reverts to Patent Danger Doctrine

TORTS: FLORIDA REVERTS TO PATENT
DANGER DOCTRINE
Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Vaughn,
491 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1986)
Respondent was injured and his wife was killed when a two-inch
dropoff in the center of a road caused their car to crash.' Approximately two years before the accident, petitioner, a contractor, had
2
repaved the road for the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT).
The DOT certified the work and transferred all responsibility for inspection and maintenance of the road to Walton CountyA Approximately three weeks before the accident, a Walton County commissioner inspected the road and observed the dropoff. 4 The dropoff had
not been repaired when respondent's car encountered the dropoff and
crashed.- Respondent sued petitioner on grounds of negligence, strict
liability, and warranty.6 The trial court granted petitioner's motion
for summary judgment.7 The Florida First District Court of Appeal
reversed,8 stating that petitioner could be held liable for injury caused
by the defect even though the defect was patent 9 to Walton County.1°
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the First District's decision
and HELD, a contractor's or manufacturer's defective work fails to

1. 491 So. 2d 551, 552-53 (Fla. 1986). Respondent's wife was driving the car and respondent
was a passenger. Id. at 552.
2. Id. The DOT tested the paving materials at both the petitioner's plant and the paving
site. The work met all DOT requirements. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Erosion of the southbound lane of County Road 1087 had created the drop-off. Id.
5. Id. at 552-53.
6. Id. at 553. In addition to suing the petitioner, the respondent also sued Walton County.
Id. at 554 n.2.
7. Id. at 553. The trial court gave no rationale for its decision. Id.
8. Id.
9. A patent defect is either a defect that is clearly visible or one that can be discovered
by a prudent inspection. U.C.C. § 2-605(1) (1978); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (5th ed.
1979).
10. Chadbounze, 491 So. 2d at 553.
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proximately cause", injury to a third party if, prior to the injury, the
12
purchaser accepts the work and the defect becomes patent.
Early courts declined to hold contractors or manufacturers liable
for injuries to third parties even if their defective work caused the
injuries. 13 These courts reasoned that the plaintiff could not recover
from the contractor or manufacturer because no privity of contract
existed between the parties. 4 By the early twentieth century, however, many courts had shifted to a more modern analysis, 15 noting
that an owner's negligent failure to correct an obvious defect breaks
the chain of causation between the contractor and the injury. 6
The adoption of comparative negligence in many states confused
the analysis of liability for patently defective work. 17 A comparative

11. An act is a proximate cause of an injury if the act is more than an incidental factor in
bringing about the injury. See S.C. Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414,
419 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); see also Herron v. Smith Bros., 116 Cal. App.
518, 521, 2 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Ct. App. 1931) (proximate cause is the dominant cause, not just
an incidental cause).
12. Chadbourne, 491 So. 2d at 554. The instant court also addressed the collateral issue of
whether the petitioner produced a "product" as is required by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965). See infra notes 49 & 53 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Necker v. Harvey, 49 Mich. 517, 14 N.W. 503 (1883) (dictum indicating that
since the elevator manufacturer contracted only with the purchaser, he would not be liable to
a third party injured by the elevator); Roddy v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S.W. 1112
(1891) (third party could not recover from defendant railroad for injuries caused by a defective
train car since the third party's employer, and not the plaintiff, contracted with the railroad).
14. See, e.g., Schade v. Gehner, 133 Mo. 252, 258, 34 S.W. 576, 577 (1896) (right of action
could not accrue to one not privy to contract); Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402,
403 (K.B. 1842) ("[W]herever a wrong arises merely out of the breach of a contract . . . the
party who made the contract alone can sue."). The rationale for this traditional rule was that
it would be wrong to find a contractor or manufacturer liable to a third party when the contractor
or manufacturer no longer had control over the item that caused the injury. Slavin v. Kay, 108
So. 2d 462, 466 (Fla. 1958).
15. See, e.g., Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 235, 196 N.W. 171, 174 (1923)
("The law of contract has no application."); Casey v. Hoover, 114 Mo. App. 47, 89 S.W. 330
(Ct. App. 1905) (even though no privity, bridge builder found liable to third party injured when
bridge collapsed).
16. See, e.g., Goar, 157 Minn. at 228. 196 N.W. at 171 (contractor had a right to assume that
once owner accepted contractor's work, owner would undertake duty of inspection and maintenance); Casey, 114 Mo. App. at 63, 89 S.W. at 334 ('qntervening negligence of the proprietor
... is the proximate cause, and not the original negligence of the contractor"); McLaughlin v.
Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 71, 181 N.E.2d 430, 435, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 414
(1962) (failure of fireman to correct or warn about a known defect was "so gross as to supersede
the negligence of the defendant").
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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negligence system diminishes any damage award in proportion to the
relative degree of fault of the person seeking the damages.' 8 Comparative negligence introduced confusion as to whether a party with knowledge of the defect at issue could be less than completely at fault.
Although Florida adopted comparative negligence, 9 Florida courts
continued to hold that a contractor was not liable for injuries caused
employer accepted the work and
by defective work if the contractor's
20
defect.
the
of
had knowledge
2
Florida first adopted the patent danger doctrine in Slavin v. Kay, '
a case decided before the adoption of comparative negligence. The
Florida Supreme Court indicated that a contractor would not be liable
if the employer accepted the defective work and could have discovered
and remedied the defect.- In Slavin, the appellee contractor's faulty
installation of a washbasin in a hotel caused the washbasin to fall and
injure appellant, a guest.23 Appellant sued the contractor under a
negligence theory. 24 Although the Slavin court held the contractor
liable because the defect was not visible to the hotel upon inspection,
the court implied that the existence of a patent defect would eliminate
the causal connection between the contractor's negligence and the
appellant's injury.?- The court implicitly adopted the patent danger

18. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
875 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
19. See Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 438.
20. See Easterday v. Masiello, 501 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987) (patently defective
air duct system was accepted by the contractor's employer and thus the contractor was not
liable to a third party who was injured by the air duct); Seitz v. Zac Smith & Co., 500 So. 2d
706 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987) (contractor not liable for injuries suffered by third party because
patently defective construction of tower was accepted by contractor's employer); Echols v.
Hammet Co., 423 So. 2d 923, 924-25 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983) (trial court should have allowed
instruction stating that once employer accepts contractor's work, contractor is only liable for
latent defects); Alvarez v. DeAguirre, 395 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (third party failed
to show contractor's wiring was not patently defective, and therefore, contractor was not liable
since his employer accepted the defective work). Florida follows the minority view. See Seitz,
500 So. 2d at 711 (court acknowledged it adopted the minority rule); El Shorafa v. Ruprecht,
345 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977) (court conceded that Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462
(Fla. 1958), departs from modern trend); see generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 723 (5th ed. 1984) ("It is now the almost universal rule
that the contractor is liable . . . when the work is negligently done.").
21. 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958).
22. Id. at 467.
23. Id. at 465.
24. Id. at 463. The guest also sued the motel owner under a negligence theory. Id.
25. Id. at 467.
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doctrine and held that a contractor remains the proximate cause for
injury resulting from a latent defect, but not from a patent defect.2
After Florida adopted comparative negligence, the Florida Supreme Court decided West v. CaterpillarTractor Co. 27 In West, the
decedent's husband sued appellant manufacturer under theories of
strict liability, warranty, and negligence.28 Appellee alleged that the
Caterpillar grader that struck the decedent was defectively designed,
lacking safety features needed for driving in reverse.2 The West court's
two step approach revealed the uncertainty concerning the applicability of the patent danger doctrine. First, the court adopted the strict
liability doctrine set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 0 For
a manufacturer to be liable under section 402A, contractual privity is
not required; thus, a third party can recover from a manufacturer31
Since the Restatement does not eliminate recovery if the defect is
patent,3 2 the West court's adoption of section 402A limited the Slavin
patent danger doctrine.
The West court added a requirement to Restatement section 402A.3
The court concluded that an injured third party could not recover
from a manufacturer under this section unless the manufacturer sold
the defective product knowing that it would be used without further
inspection.M This addition to section 402A eliminates liability when
the manufacturer knows there will be further inspection.s By limiting
manufacturer liability in this way, the court provided support for the

26.
27.

Id.
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).

28. Id. at 82.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 87. Among several other requirements and conditions, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A provides that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer."
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Restatement § 402A evolved from
legal scholars' unhappiness with the traditional privity concept. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 656-57 n.50 (4th ed. 1971) ("If there is to be strict liability in tort, let
there be strict liability in tort, declared outright, without any illusory contract mask." (quoting
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960))).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
33. See infra text accompanying note 34.
34. West, 336 So. 2d at 86. This was not the first time a court required the manufacturer
to know further inspection would not take place. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (manufacturer is strictly liable if it places
article on market knowing there will be no further inspection for defects).
35. West, 336 So. 2d at 86.
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patent danger doctrine. Therefore, although the West decision initially
appeared to limit the patent danger doctrine, the court's application
of section 402A revealed the court's support for the doctrine.
The West court's apparent support for the patent danger doctrine
soon eroded. In Auburn Machine Works Co. v. Jones,'6 the Florida
Supreme Court rejected the rule that a manufacturer is not liable for
a patent danger if the purchaser accepts the patently defective product. 7 In Auburn, appellant was injured by a patently dangerous
trench-digging tool he was operating. . Appellant sued the tool's manufacturer under theories of negligence, strict liability, and warranty.3 9
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summal judgment in favor of the manufacturer,40 and held that a manufacturer may be liable for injury to the operator even though the tool
was patently dangerous.41 The court held that a third party's use of
a patently defective product should no longer completely bar that
party's recovery. 42 The court ruled that comparative negligence applies
when the patent danger defense is raised, 43 and that the obviousness
of the danger is only one factor in the required analysis.Rather than applying the Auburn reasoning, the instant court resurrected Slavin,4 5 reasoning that patently observable defects break
the chain of proxwmate causation necessary for contractors or manufacturers to be liable to third parties.46 The instant court noted that
Walton County accepted the continuing responsibility to inspect the
road, 4 7 and that a county official observed the defect, yet took no

36. 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
37. Id. Although the Auburn court specifically rejected the patent danger doctrine, id.
at 1172, the court never mentioned the apparently inconsistent holding in Slavin. See id. at
1167-72.
38. Id. at 1167.
39. Id. at 1168. The appellant also sued his employer, the tool's owner. Id. at 1167. Appellant's employer, however, was granted summary judgment because of its workmen's compensation immunity. Id.
40. Id. at 1172.
41. Id. at 1167.
42. Id. at 1172. The court concluded that even if a defect is obvious, recovery is still possible
since the jury must determine the factual issue of proximate causation. Id.
43. Id. at 1167.
44. Id.
45. See Chadbourne, 491 So. 2d at 554.
46. Id.
47. Id. The instant court also stressed that Walton County and the DOT were sophisticated
purchasers. Id.
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action to repair the hazard. The chain of proximate causation was
therefore broken. Respondent argued that the Slavin patent danger
doctrine was inapplicable because Slavin concerned only a contractor,
while the instant case involved a contractor who was also a manufac-

turer. Rejecting this distinction, the court insisted that the key factor
in Slavin was the obviousness of the defect, not whether the party
4s
was a contractor or a manufacturer.
The instant court also observed that, according to West, strict
liability applies only if the manufacturer sells his product knowing
49
that the product would not be further inspected for defects. Strict
liability was inappropriate in the instant case since petitioner knew
that the county, a knowledgeable purchaser, accepted the responsibility to inspect the road.- Additionally, the court concluded that neither
a negligence theory nor a warranty theory could succeed, since proximate causation was necessary for either theory. According to the
majority, the existence of a patent defect eliminates proximate causation. Therefore, the instant court concluded that all three theories of
recovery must fail. 51
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Adkins disputed the majority's interpretation of West, 52 arguing that strict liability applies even to manufacturers who know the products will be inspected further. The minority

48. Id. The instant court concluded that it would be contrary to public policy to hold that
the patent danger doctrine applies to contractors, but not to manufacturers. Id.
49. Id. at 553-54. The instant court had previously addressed the issue of whether the
petitioner had sold a "product" as is required by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). Chadbourne, 491 So. 2d at 553. The court relied on policy to conclude that the paving
materials were not a product. Id. The court emphasized that respondent had just as much
knowledge about road construction as the petitioner did, that petitioner did not solicit buyers
in the open market, that petitioner could not reap profits at the expense of the public, that
petitioner and respondent were of equal bargaining power, and that public roads are not sold
in the "stream of commerce." Id. For the sake of argument, however, and to determine the negligence and warranty claims, the instant majority ignored the 'product" issue and continued its
proximate cause analysis. Id. at 553-54.
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 554-58 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 556-58. The instant minority also disputed the majority's conclusion that the
petitioner sold a product. Id. at 555. The minority claimed that since the petitioner manufactured
the paving mix that it incorporated into the repaved road, the paving mix satisfied the product
requirement of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. Chadbourne, 491 So. 2d at 555.
See Halpryn v. Highland Ins. Co., 426 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983) (paint applied to a
driveway was subject to a strict products liability analysis); Adobe Bldg. Centers, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 403 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (cement mix used by contractor to apply
stucco finish to homes was a product for strict liability purposes). But see Jackson v. L.A.W.
Contracting Corp., 481 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1986) (repaving of private road is improve-
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claimed that the manufacturer's relationship to the defective product,
not the knowledge of future inspections, was the true operative element in West.5
The dissent also attacked the majority's reliance on Slavin rather
than the more recent Auburn decision. Justice Adkins criticized the
application of the Slavin patent danger doctrine to the instant case,
because Florida adopted comparative negligence after Slavin.5 According to Justice Adkins, comparative negligence was designed to
equate liability with fault. 5 7 Justice Adkins asserted that the patent
danger doctrine, in contrast, fails to equate liability with fault and is
therefore inconsistent with comparative negligence., s The instant court
should have followed the Auburn approach, sending the case to the
jury rather than deciding as a matter of law that the patency of the
defect broke the chain of causation. 59 The minority claimed that Auburn's approach - letting the jury evaluate proximate causation issues
was more consistent with comparative negligence than the Slavin
patent danger doctrine. 60 Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's
failure to adopt or even to address the Auburn decision.61
Two of the judiciary's primary functions are to assess responsibility
for wrongs that have been committed and to provide a remedy for
the injured party. In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court
applied the patent danger doctrine, thus restricting the class of individuals who could legally be found responsible for plaintiff's injuries.

ment to real property rather than consumer product and therefore strict products liability is
inapplicable); Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, Inc., 433 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983)
(sewage treatment tank is a structural improvement to real estate and therefore strict products
liability is inapplicable).
54. Chwdbourne, 491 So. 2d at 556 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 556-58.
56. Id. at 557.
57. Id.
58. Id. To reveal problems with the patent danger doctrine, Justice Adkins noted that even
respondent's own negligence would not prevent his right to trial. Id. Therefore, Justice Adkins
concluded that the negligence of Walton County, a third party, should certainly not act as such
a bar. Id. at 557-58.
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 551-54. The instant majority also failed to address several other Florida cases
that specifically adopted the Auburn approach. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984) (rather than apply the patent danger doctrine, the court concluded that
the jury should determine whether plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt affected the causation
issue); Futch v. Ryder Truck Rental, 391 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980) (although operator
of defective tractor was fully aware of the defect, jury should still hear the cause of action).
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Although Auburn completely eliminated the patent danger defense,G2
the instant majority chose to apply the patent danger doctrine of
Slavin without mentioning the more recent Auburn decision. Thus,
the instant majority implicitly concluded that Florida's adoption of
comparative negligence did not affect the traditional patent danger
doctrine as espoused in Slavin.
Comparative negligence enables a plaintiff to recover from a defendant an amount proportionate to the defendant's negligence. The
patent danger exception allows a court to effectively circumvent the
doctrine of comparative negligence. Under the patent danger doctrine,
a plaintiff injured by patently defective work cannot recover from the
contractor or manufacturer under a strict liability, warranty, or negligence theory if the contractor's employer or the product's purchaser
accepts the defective work before the plaintiffs injury. Although the
contractor or manufacturer is partly at fault, the patent danger exception bars the injured plaintiffs recovery from the contractor or manufacturer.6 Adoption of the patent danger doctrine also encourages
manufacturers and contractors to make products that are excessively
defective.6 7 Manufacturers of excessively defective products can avoid
liability since these excessively defective qualities are patent.68 Because the doctrine completely protects manufacturers and contractors
who sell patently defective products,69 fault becomes irrelevant.- The
doctrine's failure to equate fault with liability conflicts with the doctrine of comparative negligence, constraining the judiciary's ability to
fairly assess responsibility for wrongs.
The instant majority concluded that proximate causation was lacking, 71 and therefore it did not reach comparative negligence analysis.
The majority focused on the West language eliminating the application
of strict liability unless the contractor or manufacturer knows that
the product is to be used without further inspection.72 From this lan62. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
63. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
65. Chadbourne, 491 So. 2d at 551-54.
66. Auburn, 366 So. 2d at 1171.
67. Id. at 1170.
68. Id. at 1170-71.
69. Id. at 1171.
70. For example, a fan manufacturer that failed to place a cage over the blades would be
liable to a person injured by putting a hand in the fan. The fan manufacturer would not be
legally responsible for the injury under the patent danger doctrine, however, since the defect
was patent. Id. at 1170.
71. Chadbourne, 491 So. 2d at 554.
72. Id. at 553.
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guage, the majority concluded that accepting property that is or becomes patently defective breaks the chain of causation between the
contractor and the injured party. a West, however, ultimately adopted
the Restatement's version of strict products liability, 74 which does not
require the contractor or manufacturer to know the product will be
used without further inspection for defects.- A primary purpose of
strict products liability is to eliminate the plaintiffs burden of having
to prove specific actions of negligence, 7 6 thus making recovery easier
than under a negligence theory. If West actually requires a manufacturer to lack knowledge about further inspection, then very few strict
products liability claims would succeed, since manufacturers could simply require purchasers to make further inspections.7 Thus, the instant
majority's view that a contractor or manufacturer must know that the
product is to be used without further inspection frustrates the purpose

of strict liability.78
The instant majority relied on a literal interpretation of West to
support its claim in the instant case that the chain of proximate cau-

73. Id. at 553-54.
74. West, 336 So. 2d at 87.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965). See, e.g., Hardin v. Montgomery
Elevator Co., 435 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983) (court interpreted West as "adopting
§ 402A in its entirety, without any intention of engrafting the questionable exception" that "the
manufacturer knew the product was not to be used without inspection for defects").
76. West, 336 So. 2d at 90. The justification for eliminating this burden of proving specific
acts of negligence is that the seller should be responsible for any accidental injuries resulting
from the use of the product since the seller is best able to obtain liability insurance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965); see generally Note, Vaughn v. Chadhourne:
Strict Liability and thw Road that Faded Away, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 359, 390-91 (1985)
(discussion of the policy reasons for making sellers become insurors of their products). But see
Gershonowitz, Comparative Causationas an Alternative to, Not a Partof, Comparative Fault
in Strict Products Liability, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483, 485 n.11 (1986) (unfair to spread the
risk of injury throughout society if injured plaintiff is partly at fault).
77. But see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964) (an automobile manufacturer cannot delegate responsibility to inspect for defects to
its dealers and is therefore strictly liable regardless of whether its dealers inspected the defective
car).
78. Cf. Haragan v. Union Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392, 1396 (D. Alaska 1970) (if the term
"inspection" is given a literal construction, strict liability would seldom be useful since an
"inspection" occurs whenever a consumer test drives a car or opens up a toy box to look at the
toy). Legal scholars have also interpreted the phrase "without inspection for defects" in order
to advance the purpose of strict liability. See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective
Products: The Road to and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30, 49 (1965) ("without
inspection for defects" should be interpreted to mean "without inspection of the parts or mechanism in which the defect claimed to be involved in this case existed").
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sation had been broken. The better approach would focus on the broad
principles of comparative negligence. Under comparative negligence,
the jury determines whether each defendant's action proximately
caused the plaintiff's injuries, and if so, in what proportion. 79 In Auburn, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the patent danger
doctrine is only a partial defense if comparative negligence is used.-o
According to Auburn, the jury must still apportion the negligence of
the contractor or manufacturer since the obviousness of a defect is
only one factor to be considered in a comparative negligence analysis.,1
The Auburn approach allows a court to meet its goal of providing
a remedy for the injured party. Instead of relying on the Slavin patent
danger doctrine to restrict the potential defendant pool, a comparative
fault analysis allows the jury to determine which defendants proximately caused the injuries.8 Injured plaintiffs have the opportunity
to recover from the manufacturer, or the contractor and its employer, assuming that the jury finds both parties at fault. In contrast,
the patent danger doctrine may deny an injured plaintiff a remedy,
especially if the employer or purchaser who accepted the defective
work is insolvent. The patent danger doctrine therefore fails to help
the judiciary to either provide remedies for injured plaintiffs or assess
responsibility in proportion to fault.
The instant majority's desire to clearly define the limits of proximate causation is admirable. Reliance on the outdated patent danger
doctrine to limit proximate causation, however, is inappropriate. The
patent danger doctrine conflicts with Florida's adoption of comparative

79. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973). The West court also indicated that
the defense of comparative negligence applies to strict liability. West, 336 So. 2d at 90. The
court concluded that a products liability claim based on negligence or strict liability must still
be subject to the same defenses or else the doctrine of comparative negligence would be effectively abolished. Id. With comparative negligence, the jury need not choose only one factor that
caused the injuries but can balance the importance of several causal factors. See generally
Gershonowitz, supra note 76, at 509-10 ("no longer necessary to choose one causal factor as the
most important (proximate) cause").
80. Auburn, 366 So. 2d at 1167.
81. Id.
82. A comparative fault analysis allows the jury to determine the proximate causation issue
even if the defect is discovered and is obviously dangerous. Martinez v. Clark Equip. Co., 382
So. 2d 878, 881-82 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980). It does not follow from this, however, that a manufacturer of a patently dangerous product will always be liable for injuries suffered by a third party.
See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (dictum indicating that a
manufacturer of obviously dangerous knives should not be found to have proximately caused
injuries suffered by a third party), affd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
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negligence. Instead of allowing this conflict to continue, the instant
court should have followed the lead of numerous other courts and
eliminated the patent danger doctrine. Although the patent danger
doctrine once may have served as a pragmatic method to determine
the limits of causation, the advent of comparative negligence requires
that the patent danger doctrine be discarded.
H. Bradley Staggs

83. See, e.g., Dorsey, 331 F. Supp. at 760 (obviousness of defect is but one factor to consider
when determining manufacturer liability); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d
571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) (New York will no longer rigidly preclude recovery if defect was
patent); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970) (jury should
not be given an instruction that a manufacturer does not have a duty to protect against injuries
caused by patent defects).
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